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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-1875 
____________ 
 
AMOS BROWN, a/k/a Nabbidin Ali, 
      Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-16-cv-08883) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler       
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 11, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 11, 2017)  
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Amos Brown, a/k/a Nabbidin Ali, appeals from an order of the District Court 
dismissing his civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm. 
 Brown filed a pro se civil rights complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a motion to 
proceed in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  In his complaint, which he later amended, Brown claimed a violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws in connection with the denial 
of a government benefit, specifically temporary rental assistance through the Work First 
New Jersey (“WFNJ”) program via a Med-1 form for people with at least 12 months of 
disability who find themselves homeless.  Brown contended that the defendant agency, 
the Camden County Board of Social Services, arbitrarily denied his application for 
individual housing, and that the Director of the Division of Family Development, 
Department of Human Services, improperly reversed the decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge who had concluded that Brown should not live in a group environment in a 
shelter.1 
 Brown attached several exhibits to his complaint, including an Initial Decision 
dated July 11, 2016 by Administrative Law Judge Robert Bingham II, reversing the 
                                              
1 Emergency assistance is provided through the WFNJ program “as a supportive service 
to meet the emergent needs of WFNJ recipients, so that recipients shall not be prevented 
from complying with the work requirement due to disruptions caused by homelessness 
and related emergencies.  Emergency assistance is also available to Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) recipients.”  N.J. Admin. Code § 10:90-6.3(a).  The program “is 
administered at the local level by county welfare agencies pursuant to regulations and 
directives promulgated by” the Department of Human Services, Division of Family 
Development.  B.H. v. N.J. Department of Human Services, 947 A.2d 698, 702 (N.J. 
Super. Ct., App. Div. 2008). 
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agency’s decision denying emergency housing assistance and ordering the agency to 
provide appropriate shelter.  Judge Bingham explained that Brown’s completed Med-1 
form indicated that he had mental health issues which were not conducive to a shelter 
placement (a placement he had refused), and that he needed stable, independent housing.  
Judge Bingham’s report indicated that the final decision, nevertheless, rested with the 
Director of the Division of Family Development pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14B-
10(c) (“The head of the agency, upon a review of the record submitted by the 
administrative law judge, shall adopt, reject or modify the recommended report and 
decision….”).  Brown also attached to his complaint Director Natasha Johnson’s Final 
Decision, dated September 6, 2016, rejecting Judge Bingham’s Initial Decision and 
affirming the agency’s determination.  The Final Decision noted that the agency had 
asked Brown to try the “safe haven” unit of a shelter for one night, where staff would 
monitor his medications and ensure that he attended required programs, and determine 
whether this unit within the shelter was appropriate for his specific needs.  According to 
the Final Decision, Brown refused the placement, walked out of the interview, and failed 
to return to the agency within 30 days, thus failing to demonstrate that he had a genuine 
housing emergency.  
 The District Court granted Brown’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.  
Then, in an order entered on March 30, 2017, the District Court dismissed Brown’s 
complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The Court construed 
Brown’s civil rights claim as arising under the procedural due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the equal protection clause, and determined that a 
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procedural due process claim could not proceed because Brown had failed to take 
advantage of all of the process available to him under state law.  Specifically, the Court 
noted that Brown had been advised in the Board’s Final Decision that he could seek 
further review in the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, and that he 
had 45 days in which to do so under Rule 2:4-1(b), Rules Governing the Courts of New 
Jersey.  Because Brown failed to take advantage of this potential state law remedy, the 
District Court reasoned, he could not pursue a constitutional due process claim in federal 
court. 
 Brown appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In his pro se brief, 
Brown argues that the agency’s housing decision was arbitrary and malicious because the 
agency did not give the proper weight to his treating psychiatrist’s diagnosis, as stated in 
the WFNJ Med-1 form, and that the diagnosis persuasively establishes that he cannot live 
in a group shelter but must instead have individual housing.  Brown argues further that 
the state procedures available to him are inadequate.  Specifically, he argues that “the 
State system of procedural due process is characterized by a ‘kangaroo court’ 
administrative review system which unlawfully empowers the Director … to arbitrarily 
second-guess and override the ALJ decision without any evidentiary support 
whatsoever.”  Petitioner’s Informal Brief, at 15 (emphasis in original).  In addition, 
Brown argues that the agency violated certain provisions of the state Administrative 
Code.  Id. at 18-19. 
 We will affirm.  The in forma pauperis statute provides that: “the court shall 
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that … the action … fails to state a 
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claim on which relief may be granted.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  A complaint fails 
to state a claim on which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it is 
based on legal conclusions that may be disregarded.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).  We conclude that the District Court properly 
dismissed Brown’s civil action under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a state actor from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  We will assume that the 
interest asserted by Brown is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protections, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and proceed to the 
question whether the procedures available in New Jersey provide him with due process of 
law.   
No federal constitutional procedural due process violation is stated where adequate 
procedures are available to a plaintiff to redress his injury and he sues in federal court 
instead of taking advantage of them.  See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 
2000);2  see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional deprivation of 
property is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as a meaningful post-
deprivation remedy is available).  A state provides constitutionally adequate process 
when it provides remedies to rectify fully a legal error by a local administrative body.  
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).  New Jersey provides an appeal as of right to the 
                                              
2 This requirement is analytically distinct from the exhaustion requirement that exists in 
other contexts; here, we are concerned only with whether the harm alleged has occurred.  
Id. 
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Appellate Division of the Superior Court from “final decisions or actions of any state 
administrative agency or officer,” Rule 2:2-3(a)(2), Rules Governing the Courts of New 
Jersey.  Here, this would include review as of right of the Final Decision of the Director 
of the Division of Family Development, Department of Human Services.  See generally 
B.H. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 947 A.2d 698 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. 
Div. 2008) (reviewing final agency decision of Department of Human Services, Division 
of Family Development, determining that public assistance claimant no longer qualified 
for Work First New Jersey/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits).  The 
judicial remedy provided is no doubt adequate.  Because Brown did not pursue the 
process available to him, the harm alleged -- a federal constitutional procedural due 
process violation -- did not occur, see Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 
and his civil rights action was properly dismissed. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
Brown’s civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
